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The U.S. Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Non-Compete
Clauses
Abstract
On January 9, 2020, the FTC held a workshop on non-compete clauses. Professor Pierce wrote this article
for a journal that is published in London primarily lawyers and economists in the UK and the EU. He
describes the powerful evidence that supports the need for the FTC to take some action to reduce the
growing trend to include non-compete clauses in many employment contracts and the difficult task the
FTC faces in deciding how to address that problem.
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.
To its credit, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is conducting a series of workshops at which
scholars discuss the most important issues that competition authorities need to address at present. This
is a summary of the workshop the FTC held on January 9 on non-compete clauses in employment
contracts. The workshop was organized to discuss the requests of several organizations that FTC issue a
rule that prohibits all non-compete clauses. The workshop began with a summary of the law applicable to
non-compete clauses. It then proceeded to a discussion of the evidence that suggests that non-compete
clauses are having serious adverse effects on the performance of markets. It concluded with a discussion
of the steps that the FTC should take to address the growing problems created by non-compete clauses.
1. The Law Applicable to Non-Compete Clauses
Common law courts have recognized that non-compete clauses in employment contracts
interfere with the performance of competitive labor markets for centuries. Common law courts tolerate
their anti-competitive effects only when they have a “good foundation” and are subject to reasonable
limits on their scope and duration.1 States in the U.S. vary greatly with respect to their tolerance for noncompete clauses. Some states ban all non-compete clauses, while others readily accept a variety of
justifications for broad non-compete clauses.2 Some states have modified the common law governing
non-compete clauses by statute. Thus, for instance, California has prohibited non-compete clauses by
statute for over a century. Some professional organizations also prohibit non-compete clauses. Thus, for
instance, the American Bar Association reaffirmed its view that non-compete clauses are unethical in an
opinion issued on December 4, 2019.3
The anti-competitive effects of non-compete clauses are obvious. They allow firms to avoid
matching the salaries and working conditions offered by their competitors and allow firms to lock in
employees for long periods of time. They are most frequently justified by the belief that they encourage
employers to make investments in employee training and research and development. They accomplish
that by protecting employers from the risk that employees will leave and provide competitors with the
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fruits of the efforts of the employer to train its employees and to provide the employees access to the
firm’s trade secrets.
In antitrust law, non-compete clauses are vertical restraints on trade that have the potential to
violate the Sherman Act. Antitrust courts have adopted an approach to non-compete clauses that is similar
to the common law approach. Courts apply the rule of reason to hold that a non-compete clause is lawful
if it is ancillary to, and justified by, a transaction or relationship that furthers the public interest and it is
reasonable in scope and duration.4 Given the overlap between contract law and antitrust law in this
context and the similarity of the tests courts use to apply both to non-compete clauses, it is not surprising
that antitrust law has played only a minor role in regulating non-compete clauses.
2. Increased Use of Non-Compete Clauses
Non-compete clauses have long been used in contracts between employers and the high level
corporate executives and other highly-educated employees who have access to a firm’s trade secrets.
Over the last few years, however, the use of non-compete clauses has increased dramatically. They now
are included in somewhere between 20% and 50% of all employment contracts, including contracts
between employers and low paid employees like workers in fast food restaurants, janitors, and delivery
drivers.
In these contexts, the contracts are classic contracts of adhesion. They are not the subject of
negotiation between employers and employees. In most cases, the employee is not even aware that the
contract includes a non-compete clause until the employee announces an intent to quit to take a job with
a competitor. At that point the employer typically brings the clause to the attention of the employee and
threatens legal action if the employee follows through with the expressed intent to quit to take a job with
a competitor. That threat is almost invariably effective in discouraging the employee from quitting.
The incidence of non-compete clauses does not vary between the states that enforce noncompete clauses and the states that have declared them to be illegal. States that refuse to enforce noncompete clauses have the same high proportion of employment contracts with non-compete clauses as
do states that enforce non-compete clauses. The vast majority of employees do not have access to the
services of a lawyer who can tell the employee that the non-compete clause in her contract is illegal and
unenforceable. Thus, the existence of an illegal and unenforceable non-compete clause and the threat to
take legal action against an employee who quits to take a job with a competitor is almost always effective
in deterring the employee from taking that action.
3. Non-Compete Clauses Contribute to the Growing Disparity in Income and Wealth
For several decades, the gap between the rich and the poor in the U.S. has grown rapidly. That
gap is creating serious economic and political problems. The increasing gap between rich and poor has
many sources, but imperfections in labor markets in general and increasing use of non-compete clauses
in particular are among the leading causes.
In theory, wages and labor productivity should correlate nearly perfectly. Until 1979, wages
increased at about the same rate as increases in labor productivity. Since then, however, productivity has
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increased much more than wages, creating a large gap between productivity and wages that can only be
explained as a symptom of serious imperfections in labor markets.5
During the same period, a large and growing gap has emerged between the wages paid by the
most profitable firms and the least profitable firms for the same units of labor.6 That gap is also
inconsistent with a properly performing competitive labor market. Many scholars attribute the growing
disparity between the profitability of dominant firms and their smaller competitors to the relaxation of
the antitrust limits on vertical restraints.
This combination of symptoms of market imperfections is enabled and exacerbated by noncompete clauses in employment contracts. Dominant firms use the clauses to preclude their employees
from switching to other firms, to exercise their market power to depress wages, and to avoid sharing their
profits with employees to the extent that a competitive market would require.
The scholars who are writing in this area fault antitrust law for tolerating vertical restraints that
firms use to obtain and maintain market power in both product markets and labor markets and for
ignoring pursuit of employee welfare as a goal of antitrust law.7 They urge antitrust enforcement agencies
to reconsider the legality of many of the practices and contractual relationships that are increasingly
implicated in studies of the causes of undue concentration in both product markets and labor markets
and to adopt employee welfare as a goal of antitrust law that should be on a par with the goal of consumer
welfare.
4. The Justifications for Non-Compete Clauses Are Weak
Non-compete clauses have been justified by the belief that they encourage employers to invest
in employee training and trade secrets by providing employers a means of protecting those investments.
The theoretical case in support of non-compete clauses is seriously incomplete, however, and it has weak
empirical support.
Non-compete clauses are not necessary to protect trade secrets. Employers have access to other
means of protecting trade secrets. Every state allows employers to sue employees and former employees
for theft of trade secrets, and many states also have statutes that make it a crime to steal a trade secret.
Non-compete clauses reduce the incentive for employees to invest in their own human capital by
reducing the returns they can earn on those investments. Moreover, non-compete clauses reduce the
positive spillover effects of both employee mobility and information flows among competing firms.
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Recent empirical studies have found that non-compete clauses have significant adverse economic
effects. States that prohibit non-compete clauses experience significantly greater innovation and
stronger economic performance than states that enforce widespread strong non-compete clauses.
8

5. Antitrust Law Should Reflect Greater Concern About the Effects of Vertical Restraints
Between 1975 and 2020, antitrust enforcement agencies and courts changed their views about
vertical restraints on competition. This change was induced by scholarly writing by economists and
economically literate law professors that provided theoretical support for the belief that many of the
practices and contractual relationships that had previously been held to violate antitrust law were either
harmless or socially beneficial.9
There is a growing consensus among antitrust scholars that the movement toward increased
tolerance of vertical restraints on competition has gone too far. There is increasing evidence that many
vertical restraints have serious adverse effects in many important contexts. Recent issues of law journals
are full of articles and symposiums that include studies that find that many vertical restraints harm
markets and that propose changes in antitrust law that are intended to respond to the problems caused
by vertical restraints.10 Steven Salop’s views are representative: “Strong enforcement is particularly
important in markets where economies of scale and network effects lead to barriers to entry and durable
market power.”11
Non-compete clauses are a type of vertical constraint on competition. Given their adverse effects
on employee mobility, competitive conditions in labor markets, wages, distribution of wealth, innovation,
and economic performance, coupled with their weak justification, they provide a good place to start the
process of revising the approach of antitrust enforcement agencies to vertical restraints. The author of
the leading Treatise on Antitrust Law, Herb Hovenkamp, has identified antitrust law’s historic failure to
deal adequately with labor markets as a problem that needs to be addressed.12 He has also identified the
increased use of non-compete clauses as a disturbing trend that should attract the attention of antitrust
enforcement agencies.
6. Procedures Available to FTC to Address Non-Compete Clauses
Non-compete clauses are a good candidate for a rulemaking. Unfortunately, the statutes the FTC
has the power to implement have features that make it difficult for the FTC to issue rules. The FTC has no
power to issue rules to implement the two primary antitrust statutes – the Sherman Act and the Clayton
Act. It can enforce those statutes only by bringing cases against firms that it believes to be in violation of
the statutes.
The FTC also has responsibility to enforce section five of the Federal Trade Commission Act. That
section gives the FTC power to determine that an act or practice is illegal because it is an “unfair method
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of competition” or “an unfair or deceptive act or practice.” The FTC has the power to issue rules to
implement section five.
Section five is broad enough to support the issuance of a rule that prohibits or limits non-compete
clauses. The breadth of the statute is a source of problems, however. Courts are reluctant to uphold
attempts by the FTC to take an action that is based solely on section five because of concern that the
open-ended nature of the power conferred by section five might allow the FTC to take actions beyond
those that Congress contemplated when it enacted the statute in 1914. Congress was so concerned about
the potential for the FTC to overreach in implementing section five that it amended the statute in 1975
by adding a long list of burdensome and time-consuming procedures to the already demanding notice and
comment procedure that all agencies must use to issue rules. That statutory amendment created a
situation in which the FTC has rarely attempted to issue rules to implement section five.13
During the workshop, I urged the FTC to issue a guidance document in which it announces its
interpretation of the Sherman Act and section five of the FTC Act as those statutes apply to non-compete
clauses and its policies with respect to enforcement of competition law in the context of non-compete
clauses. The FTC is not required to use any burdensome procedures in the process of issuing a guidance
document.14 The FTC has complete discretion with respect to the procedures it uses to issue a guidance
document.
A guidance document cannot be the basis for any formal action. The FTC can enforce the statutory
interpretations and policies announced in a guidance document only through adjudications in which the
FTC must support its interpretations and policies with evidence and reasoning. Even though guidance
documents have no formal legal effect, they can serve many good purposes.
Most firms act in accordance with guidance documents even though they have no formal legal
effect. Guidance documents place firms on notice that some types of conduct will place them in jeopardy
of being held to have violated the law. That greatly reduces the likelihood that firms will act in ways that
a guidance document characterizes as unlawful and identifies as a target of agency enforcement actions.
One of the effects of a guidance document is to enlist the assistance of lawyers in private practice who
inform their clients of an agency’s interpretations of statutes and enforcement policies that are
announced in guidance documents.
State legislatures and courts are also likely to be influenced by a guidance document that
announces and explains in detail why FTC has adopted the statutory interpretation and enforcement
policy announced in the document. The effects of the guidance document are likely to be felt both in labor
law and in state antitrust law.
The guidance document should announce that the FTC interprets the Sherman Act and section
five of the FTC Act to establish a presumption that non-compete clauses are unlawful and that the FTC is
making enforcement of that statutory interpretation a priority. FTC should follow-up on the issuance of
the guidance document by initiating actions against firms that include broad non-compete clauses in their
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employment contracts, beginning with firms that include non-compete clauses in contracts with low paid
employees. It is unimaginable that any firm can justify use of non-compete clauses in that context.
Several participants in the workshop argued that the FTC should instead issue a rule under section
five of the FTC Act in which it declares that non-compete clauses are illegal in specified circumstances.
Such a rule would have major advantages over a guidance document. It would have the same force and
effect as a statute, so it would be easy to enforce. Moreover, the notice and comment process would
permit the public and regulated firms to participate in the process of shaping the rule. The proponents of
that approach believe that those advantages justify the years of effort required to issue such a rule.
Conclusion
Whether the FTC acts by issuing a guidance document coupled with enforcement actions against
individual firms or by issuing a rule, the FTC’ s initial action is unlikely to take the form of a determination
that all non-compete clauses are unlawful. There was a broad consensus among the participants in the
workshop that the studies of non-compete clauses that are available to the FTC today are inadequate to
support such a complete prohibition. Thus, for instance, there are studies that find that non-compete
clauses have socially-beneficial effects in the context of doctors and corporate chief executives.
There was widespread agreement that any rule or guidance document that the FTC issues on noncompete clauses will have to be limited in scope to low paid workers or workers who do not have access
to trade secrets or will have to exempt some high level employees. There was also broad agreement that
the FTC’s excellent staff of economists should undertake additional studies of the effects of non-compete
clauses to fill some of the gaps in our knowledge that exist today.
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